ABSTRACT SPECK, a family of lightweight block ciphers proposed by the National Security Agency (NSA), is widely used under resource constrained environment. There are many cryptanalytic results on SPECK concentrated on differential and linear attacks. However, the security evaluation against other popular cryptanalysis methods seems to lag behind. In this paper, we investigate both the security of SPECK against impossible differential, zero-correlation linear, and integral attacks as well as the design choice of NSA. First, we construct the satisfiability (SAT)-based model to automatically search impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls and then obtain several integral distinguishers based on the links between the zero-correlation linear hull and integral distinguisher. Second, based on the new distinguishers, we propose the first zero-correlation attack on 11-round SPECK64 and integral attack on 11-round SPECK32, SPECK48, and SPECK64 by exploring the iterated expression of the modulo subtraction operation and utilizing the partial-sum technique. Finally, we study the design principle of the rotation parameters selection of SPECK32. We show that SPECK32 with parameters (8, 3) is better than SPECK32 with the original parameters (7, 2) with respect to security against impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral cryptanalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
SPECK [1] is an ARX-based lightweight block cipher introduced by NSA in 2013, which can provide optimal software performance on resource constrained devices. It has a generalized Feistel structure only composed of modulo addition, bitwise rotation and bitwise XOR. The SPECK family is comprised of different variants according to the block sizes and key sizes to meet various need. Due to its simple structure and general applicability, SPECK has received much attention since its publication.
The main cryptanalytic results are concentrated on differential and linear cryptanalysis. Abed et al. [2] first presented differential attacks for almost all variants of SPECK. Biryukov et al. [3] searched the better differential characteristics for SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64 and Dinur [4] improved the key recovery attacks on all variants of SPECK. In [5] , Biryukov demonstrated automatic algorithm to search the best differential trails and gave the improved differential characteristics results based on MILP. For linear attack,
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Yao et al. [6] gave linear attacks on SPECK with different block sizes preliminarily. Further, Fu et al. [7] applied the automatic search method to SPECK and resulted in the improved linear approximations.
However, the security of SPECK against other cryptanalysis methods seems to lag behind. For impossible attack, Lee et al. [8] used MILP-based automatic search tool to find some new six-round impossible differential characteristics of SPECK64, but they gave no further specific attack process. Then, [9] presented 10-round impossible differential cryptanalysis on SPECK32 and SPECK48. For zero-correlation linear attack, Chen [10] found 6-round zerocorrelation linear hulls of SPECK32 and SPECK48, further described zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis on 11-round SPECK32 and SPECK48, but the security of other variants of SPECK is still unclear. For integral attack, as far as we know, there is no literature on integral cryptanalysis of SPECK. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out security analysis of SPECK against these popular cryptanalysis methods.
Besides, although SIMON and SPECK are both proposed by NSA, the designers do not provide any security analysis or justification of the design choices for SIMON and SPECK.
This lack of openness necessarily gives rise to curiosity and caution. Later, many researchers investigated the security of SIMON-like ciphers considering differential and linear attacks [11] , impossible and integral attacks [12] for all design choices. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no results in the analysis of SPECK parameters selection, thus it is necessary to study design rationale of SPECK so that the community can have more confidence on those designs.
In this paper, we focuses on impossible differential, zerocorrelation linear and integral attacks on reduced-round SPECK. We build a SAT-based model to automatic search impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK. SAT is the Boolean Satisfiability Problem. It is an NPC problem and considers whether there is a valid assignment to Boolean variables satisfying a given set of Boolean conditions. SAT solver has great advantages with the open source, good interface, high efficiency and perfect compatibility. Recently, the SAT-based method has been developed to be a popular method to automatically search for the differential and linear characteristics. In 2013, Mouha and Preneel [13] proposed a SAT-based tool for finding optimal differential characteristics of ARX ciphers. Later, Song et al. [14] utilized the framework in [13] to find differential characteristics of SPECK and LEA. In CRYPTO 2015, Kölbl et al. [11] used SAT/SMT(Satisfiability Modulo Theories) model to find both optimal differential and linear characteristics for SIMON. Later, Liu et al. [15] solved the problem of searching optimal linear trails using SAT to find optimal linear trails for reduced round of SPECK and Chaskey. Inspired by their work, we construct the SAT-based model to search impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK. Then we obtain several integral distinguishers of SPECK according to the links between integral distinguisher and zero-correlation linear hull. Based on the new distinguishers, we evaluate the security level on SPECK family ciphers against zero-correlation linear and integral cryptanalysis. Besides, we apply the automatic methods to investigate the design principle and give security analysis of the rotation parameters selection for SPECK. In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
(1) We construct SAT-based model to estimate whether a given pair of input and output differences or masks can lead to impossible differential or zero-correlation linear hull for certain round of SPECK. By traversing the input and output sets of low Hamming weight, we find 3, 20 and 157 6-round impossible differentials of SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64, and get 10, 15 and 83 zero-correlation linear hulls for 6-round SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64. Furthermore, based on the links between integral distinguisher and zero-correlation linear hull of SPECK, we obtain several 6-round integral distinguishers of SPECK and then verify some distinguishers experimentally.
(2) We launch key recovery attacks on reduced-round SPECK utilizing zero-correlation and integral cryptanalysis based on the new distinguishers. First, we present an iterated expression of the modulo subtraction operation.
These expressions can be used to guess the corresponding subkeys by bit and reduce the complexity of partial decryption in the key recovery process. Then, we propose a zerocorrelation linear attack on 11-round SPECK64. Besides, we propose the first integral cryptanalysis on 11-round SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64 by using the partial-sum technique. To our knowledge, there are no integral attacks on SPECK so far and we bridge this gap. Table 1 summarizes our attack results of reduced-round SPECK. (3) We investigate the design principle of the rotation parameters selection of SPECK32. Regarding impossible differential and zero-correlation linear attacks, we apply the SAT-based model to obtain the number and upper bound of rounds of impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls to compare strength of the rotation parameters. Regarding integral attack, we construct a parallel solution architecture based on CUDA utilizing Wang et al. [16] approach to experimentally search integral distinguishers and evaluate the choices of rotation parameters. We show that SPECK32 with original parameter (7, 2) may not be the best alternative with respect to the resistance against impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral cryptanalysis. We present that SPECK32 with parameters (8, 3) is better than SPECK32 with parameters (7, 2) . Our work contributes to the evaluation of the design space, and further sheds more light on the undisclosed design criteria of SPECK.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some notations and properties used in this paper and gives a brief description of SPECK family ciphers. Section III proposes automatic search tool to find impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK, and then gives new integral distinguishers. Section IV launches specific zero-correlation cryptanalysis of SPECK64 and proposes the integral attacks on reduced-round SPECK. We then compare strength of rotation parameters to study the design rationale of SPECK32 in Section V. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
We give some notations which will be used in the rest of this paper. SPECK 2n/4n denotes the block and key size of the SPECK are 2n and 4n. We denote by SPECK (a,b) the variant of SPECK which the bitwise circular movement of left and right words are (a, b). L i and R i are the left and right half intermediate values of the i-th round input in the encryption, and the j-th bit ofL i is denoted as L i (j), the j-th bit of R i is denoted as R i (j). K i is an n-bit round key for the i-th round.
is the modulo addition and is the modulo subtraction. <<<i and i>>> denote circular left and right shift by ibits.
∧ and are bitwise AND operation. ⊕ is the XOR operation, x is the negation of x.
B. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION ON SPECK
SPECK is a family of ARX-based block ciphers. It has a generalized Feistel structure containing five variants according to the block sizes of 32, 48, 64, 96 and 128-bit, which can be further divided into ten variants along with key size. The round function is consisted of XOR, modulo addition and rotation operations, which is shown in Figure 1 . where α and β denote the bitwise circular movement of left and right words. We denote the input and output of the i-th round as (L i−1 , R i−1 ) and (L i , R i ), the round function is updated as follows:
We list the different parameters for SPECK in Table 2 . From Table 2 , we know that only the rotation parameters of SPECK32 is (7, 2) , and the rotation parameters of other variants of SPECK are (8, 3) , which arouses our great interest in exploiting the design rationale of SPECK.
C. SOME OBSERVATIONS OF MODULO OPERATION
Sun et al. [17] proposed an iterated expression of module addition operation. Considering modulo subtraction operation is used in the decryption process, we give an iterated Boolean expression of the modulo subtraction operation. Let x = (x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n−1 ), y = (y 0 , y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ), and z = (z 0 , z 1 , · · · , z n−1 ) be n-bit vectors with z = xy, and c i is the i-th borrow bit. Then the Boolean functions of
These expressions can be used to guess the corresponding subkeys by bit in the key recovery process, and then reduce the complexity of partial decryption when we apply impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral attacks to SPECK.
III. NEW DISTINGUISHERS OF SPECK
In this section, we try to find new impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral distinguishers of SPECK by considering the structural characteristic of SPECK, which can lay the foundation for the next specific analysis. [19] . Unlike differential cryptanalysis exploiting high differential characteristic to receive right keys, the core of impossible differential cryptanalysis is finding impossible differentials to filter out wrong keys. The length and number of the impossible differentials play important roles in a success of the cryptanalysis. If we find longer impossible differentials, we can improve the rounds of known attacks. Besides, more impossible differentials may reduce the time and data complexities in the process of the cryptanalysis. Recently, Lee et al. [8] built a MILP model to search longer impossible differential and found 6-round impossible differentials for SPECK64 in 10 minutes. In this subsection, we analyze the differential properties of the components and transform the differential properties into the set of Boolean expressions. We construct the SAT model to search impossible differentials of SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64.
A. NEW IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIALS OF SPECK
The round function of SPECK is based on three operations: modulo addition, bitwise rotation and exclusive-OR. Modulo addition is the only non-linear operation. For each component, there are different Boolean constraints to depict differential behaviors for SAT model.
1) CONSTRAINTS OF DIFFERENTIAL BEHAVIORS
For exclusive-OR (⊕) with input differenceα, β and output difference γ , to obtain a valid differential, the constraint VOLUME 7, 2019 should be α ⊕ β = γ . For the circular shift (t) with input differences αand output difference γ , the constraint should be γ = αt. For modulo addition ( ), we can get the constraint for SAT model based on the following theorem.
Theorem 1 [20] : The differential (α, β → γ ) through modular addition with input differences α, β and output difference γ is valid if and only if
Based on Theorem 1, to obtain a valid differential through modular addition, the constraint in SAT model should be
We combine the constraints of the components together and construct Boolean expressions to depict the differential behaviors of SPECK round function. Next, we traverse special subsets, where the Hamming weight of input and output differences is 1. We called SAT solvers STP to execute the model using our personal computer (Intel Core i7-6700 (3.4GHz), 7.8GBRAM, Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS), then we find 3, 20 and 157 impossible differentials of SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64 within 13.7 seconds, 32.9 seconds and 61.6 seconds, respectively. The time of searching impossible differentials of SPECK64 is really efficient compared with the results in [8] . Table 3 and 4 give impossible differentials of SPECK32 and SPECK48. Table 10 gives the automatic search results of SPECK64 in Appendix, where e i denotes the i-th bit of the byte is 1 and other bits are 0. 
B. ZERO-CORRELATION LINEAR HULLS OF SPECK
Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis is one of the popular cryptanalytic methods introduced by Bogdanov and Rijmen [21] . The attack is based on linear approximations with zero correlation and achieves many unexpected results. The main way to construct zero-correlation linear hull is based on miss-in-the-middle approach. Chen [10] just gave one 6-round zero correlation linear hull of SPECK32 and SPECK48, respectively. In this subsection, we automatically search zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64 utilizing the SAT-based model. We exploit the linear behaviors of every component in SPECK.
1) CONSTRAINTS OF LINEAR BEHAVIORS
For XOR operation with input mask u, v and output mask w, to obtain a valid linear approximation, the constraint should be u = v = w. For the case of circular shift t with input mask u and output mask v, the constraint should be v = ut. For the branching operation with the input mask u and the output masks w 1 and w 2 , the constraint should be u = w 1 = w 2 . For modulo addition (), Schulte-Geers [22] proposed an explicit result on calculating the correlation of linear approximations through modular addition.
Therorem 2 [22] : Let z be an n-bit vector satisfying
where w is the output mask, u and v are the input masks in a linear approximation of addition modulo 2 n . Then the correlation of the linear approximation is given by
where
|z| is the Hamming weight of z ∈ F n 2 . Based on Theorem 2, Liu et al. [15] gave constraints below for a valid linear approximation of the input masks u, v and output mask w through addition modulo mod 2 n .
We use the constraints (4) to obtain a valid linear approximation for modular addition and combine the constraints of all operations together to character the linear properties for certain rounds of SPECK. We call STP solver to automatically search 6-round zero-correlation linear hulls for SPECK by traversing all cases that the Hamming weight of input mask is 1 and output mask is 2. Finally, we get 10, 15 and 83 zero-correlation linear hulls for SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64. The search results of SPECK32 and SPECK48 are listed in Table 5 and 6. We give the results of SPECK64 in Table 11 (see Appendix) and verify a 6-round zero-correlation linear approximation by miss-in-the-middle approach in Figure 2 in Appendix, where e i denotes the i-th bit of the byte is 1 and other bits are 0.
C. NEW INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHERS OF SPECK
Integral attack is one of the most popular cryptanalytic tools for block ciphers. In 1997, Daemen et al. [23] proposed a new method to attack SQUARE. By summarizing previous works, Knudsen and Wagner [24] further put forward the idea of integral attack at FSE 2002. The integral attack selects a specific form of plaintexts to encrypt, and makes sum of some parts of the obtained corresponding ciphertexts, and then uses the integral distinguishers to verify key guess. The key point of integral attack is to find integral distinguishers. In this subsection, we obtain some new integral distinguishers of SPECK based on the links between integral distinguisher and zero-correlation linear hull. We additionally verify these integral distinguishers using the experiment methods proposed by Wang et al. [16] .
1) LINKS BETWEEN ZERO-CORRELATION LINEAR HULL AND INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHER
For ARX ciphers, split the inputs into three parts and outputs into two parts H :
Wen and Wang [25] showed that a zero-correlation linear approximation implies to an integral distinguisher which is concluded in the following theorem. Theorem 3 [25] : If the input and output linear masks a and b are independent and approximation for H has correlation zero for any a = (a 1 ||1, 0), a 1 ∈ F r 2 and any b
2 , the sum of XOR of the function H 1 According to Corollary 1, we give a method of converting a zero-correlation linear approximation into an integral distinguisher. For an r-round zero-correlation linear approximation (α / →β), the contradiction bits of the distinguisher are denoted as . Select a set α 1 including some appropriate bit positions of input mask, then test whether ((α 1 ||1, 0)β) is an r-round zero-correlation linear approximation and the contradiction bits is . If so, fix the bit position of α 1 to be a constant value, and traverse all the remaining bit positions, thus we can obtain an r-round integral distinguisher.
For SPECK32, split the inputs into three parts and the outputs into two parts H :
2 . According to Corollary 1 and the experiment results, 6-round zero-correlation linear hulls {(0, 0, 0, e 7 ) / →(0, e 2 , 0, e 2 ) and (0, 0, 0, e 7 ) / →(0, e 3 , 0, e 3 )} can be converted into the corresponding integral distinguishers. For example, (0, 0, 0, e 7 ) (0, e 2 , 0, e 2 ) can be converted into an integral distinguisher:
(AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, ACCAAAAA) → ( * * * * * * * * , * * * * * B 1 * * , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * B 2 * * ),
where A is active bit, Cis constant, B 1 and B 2 repsent B 1 ⊕B 2 is the balanced bit, * is the arbitrary bit. For SPECK48, split the inputs into three parts and the outputs into two parts H : → ( * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * B 1 , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * B 2 , * * * * * * * * ), where A is active bit, Cis constant, B 1 and B 2 repsent B 1 ⊕B 2 is the balanced bit, * is the arbitrary bit.
For SPECK64, split the inputs into three parts and the outputs into two parts H : F 2 ×F 2 ×F 62 2 ⊕F 2 2 ×F 62 2 . We show that all the 6-round zero-correlation linear hulls with the input linear mask (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,e 6 ) in Table 11 can be converted, and we obtain 15 new integral distinguishers. → ( * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * B 1 , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * B 2 , * * * * * * * * )., where A is active bit, Cis constant, B 1 and B 2 represent B 1 ⊕ B 2 is the balanced bit, * is the arbitrary bit.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF REDUCED-ROUND SPECK A. ZERO-CORRELATION LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS OF SPECK64
Chen [10] presented zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis on 11-round SPECK32 and SPECK48. But the security of other variants of SPECK against zero-correlation linear attack is still unclear. In this subsection, we give the specific cryptanalysis result of SPECK64. Based on the 6-round zerocorrelation linear approximation (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 5 , 0) (0, 0, e 0 , 0, 0, 0, e 0 , 0), we can attack 11-round SPECK64 if we add two rounds before and three rounds after the zero-correlation linear hull. The involved keys and state values in the initial two rounds encryption and final three rounds decryption are depicted in Figure 3 . In the key recovery process, we need to guess K 1 (5) when calculating R 2 (5). Since the key bit K 1 (5)is Xored with the output of the second round, it will not affect the calculation of the linear correlation as long as the value of the key bit is fixed. So we can move the key bit into the zero-correlation linear approximation and do not need to guess it. Besides, according to the characteristic of the modular addition on domain, we do not need to guess K 0 (5, 13)corresponding to the most significant non-zero state bit when calculating the output of first round L 1 and R 1 . Similarly, K 9 (27) also needs not to be guessed. Therefore, it is necessary to guess 70 bits key totally. In the last three rounds of decryption process, we can use Equation (2) to decrypt partially, thus can reduce the time complexity by partial-sum technique. The specific process is as follows.
( Step 1: Collect all the 2 64 plaintexts, encrypt the plaintexts to obtain the corresponding ciphertexts.
Step 2: We guess the partial bits of the subkey K 0 , and partially encrypt two rounds of plaintexts to obtain R 2 (5). Then we guess the partial bits of the subkey K i (8 ≤ i ≤ 10), and partially decrypt three rounds of ciphertexts to obtain L 8 (8) ||R 8 (8) . Allocate counters to count the number of linear approximations and filter out the right key candidates.
Step 3: Exhaustive searching the remaining subkey candidates, test the master key candidates using two plaintextciphertext pairs to obtain the correct key.
Complexity Analysis: The data complexity is 2 64 known plaintexts. In the course of the attack, the memory complexity in Step 
B. INTEGRAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF REDUCED-ROUND SPECK
In this subsection, we use the new 6-round integral distinguishers to propose the first integral attack on SPECK by making using of partial-sum technique.
1) INTEGRAL ATTACK ON SPECK32
In order to reduce the number of chosen plaintexts and the guessed keys, we use the method in [16] to experimentally search a 3-order integral distinguisher of SPECK32:
(AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, CCCAAAAA) → ( * * * * * * * * , B 1 * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * * , B 2 * * * * * * * ),
where A is active bit, Cis constant, B 1 and B 2 repsent B 1 ⊕ B 2 is the balanced bit, * is the arbitrary bit. On the basis of this distinguisher, supposing (L 1 , R 1 ) = (AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, AAAAAAAA, CCCAAAAA), then we can obtain 7-round distinguisher of SPECK32 (see Figure 4 ) by adding one round ahead. We propose 11-round integral attack on SPECK32 based on the 7-round integral distinguisher. Figure 5 lists the guessed keys and inner states. In the key recovery process, we make use of partial-sum technique to reduce the time complexity based on Equation (2) when we partially decrypt four rounds to verify the balanced bits. The specific process is as follows.
(1) For 2 16 guesses of K 10 and 2 29 ciphertexts, set the counter R e 1 of size 2 32 where the length of each element is one bit and is initialized to 0, calculate the 32-bit values L 10 R 10 and increase the value of the corresponding counter by one. Keep counters whose numbers are odd. The time complexity of this step is 2 29+16 × 1 11 ≈ 2 41.54 . (2) For 2 16 guesses of K 9 and the remaining values, calculate the 26-bit values L 9 (0 ∼ 13) R 9 (2 ∼ 13), set the counter vector R e 2 [L 9 (0 ∼ 11) S 9 (0 ∼ 11)] of size 2 24 where S 9 = (L 9 ⊕ R 9 ) 2, and the length of each element is one bit and is initialized to 0, then increase the value of the corresponding counter by one. Keep the values whose numbers are odd. The time complexity of this step is 2 32+16+16 × (7)). If the value equals 1, then the guessed keys are wrong. Otherwise, the guessed keys are the right candidate keys. The time complexity of this step is 2 5+16+16+3+9+1 × 2 11×32 ≈ 2 48.54 . It is necessary to guess 45-bit keys in the key recovery process above. Since we only estimate whether⊕(L 7 (7) ⊕ R 7 (7)) = 0, the total key candidate space is reduced to 2 44 from 2 45 . With the addition of remaining 19-bit keys, there are still 2 63 candidate keys. For the 2 63 candidate keys, check the correctness using plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The attack process can be summarized as follows.
Step 1: We construct a set containing 2 29 plaintexts. The plaintexts in the set satisfy the following properties: the output after encryption one round is in the form (AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, CCCA, AAAA). Encrypt the plaintexts to obtain the corresponding ciphertexts.
Step 2: We guess partial bits of the subkey K i (7 ≤ i ≤ 10), and partially decrypt four rounds of 2 29 ciphertexts to calculate the value ⊕(L 7 (7) ⊕ R 7 (7)).When the value equals zero, we remain the corresponding guessed keys.
Step 3: For each candidate keys, guess the remaining 19-bit keys of K i (7 ≤ i ≤ 10), check the correctness of the keys using two plaintext-ciphertext pairs and obtain the correct key.
Complexity Analysis: The data complexity of the attack on SPECK32 is 2 29 chosen plaintexts.
In the course of the attack, we need store 45 bits of 2 44 guessed subkeys, and the memory complexity of the temporary counters can be ignored, so the memory complexity is 2 46.49 bytes. 
2) INTEGRAL ATTACK ON SPECK48 AND SPECK64
The integral attack process of SPECK48 and SPECK64 is similar to SPECK32, so we just give a brief presentation of the integral attacks on 11-round SPECK48/96 and 11-round SPECK64/128.
For SPECK48, based on the 6-round integral distinguisher in subsection 3.3, we can attack 11-round SPECK48 if we add one round before and four rounds after the integral distinguisher. The involved keys and state values are depicted in figure 6 in Appendix. We also use partial-sum technique to reduce the time complexity. In the key recovery process, we need to guess 69-bit keys to partially decrypt four rounds of 2 47 ciphertexts to calculate the value ⊕(l 7 (8) ⊕ r 7 (8)). Besides, we need to check the correctness using two plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the 2 95 candidate keys. The data complexity of the attack on SPECK48 is 2 47 chosen plaintexts. In the course of the attack, we need store 69 bits of 2 68 guessed subkeys, so the memory complexity is 2 71 For SPECK64, the involved keys and the state values of attacking 11-round SPECK64 are depicted in figure 7 in Appendix. In the key recovery process, we use partial-sum technique to reduce the time complexity. Totally we need to guess 93-bit keys to partially decrypt four round of 2 63 ciphertexts to calculate the value ⊕(l 7 (8) ⊕ r 7 (8) 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PARAMETER CHOICES OF SPECK
SPECK family can be divided into ten variants along with key size. Only the rotation parameters of SPECK32 is (7, 2) while the rotation parameters of other variants of SPECK are (8, 3) . Design rationale of block cipher is often provided by the designers, however, the designers of SPECK gave no justification for the choice of rotation parameters. In the section, we study design rationale of SPECK32. We evaluate the parameters quality and compare strength of rotation parameters in SPECK32 with respect to security against impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral attacks. We show that the original rotation parameters (7, 2) in SPECK32 have reasonably good resistance against these attacks, but may be not the best alternative. 
A. COMPARISON RESULTS OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS FOR IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIALS
Utilizing the SAT-based model, we can easily derive the number of impossible differential characteristics for certain rounds of SPECK. Besides, by repackaging the output interface of the STP solver, we establish an automated SAT\SMT model, which can give the upper bound of rounds of impossible differentials under special input and output differential sets for arbitrary rotation parameters. Here, we compare the strength of SPECK32 (7, 2) with the original rotation parameters (7, 2) and SPECK32 (8, 3) with rotation parameters (8, 3) used in SPECK family for other block sizes.
Notice that if we have more bits with 1 in a certain state, then we have more bits with unknown in the next state. Thus the number of extended rounds of impossible differential paths is reduced. Therefore, it is sufficient that we search paths starting with input and output differences of low Hamming weight. We traverse the sets that the Hamming weight of input and output differences are both 1, and then search the number of rounds of impossible differentials for SPECK32 (7, 2) andSPECK32 (8, 3) . We show the results in Table 7 .
From Table 7 , we observe that the least upper bound of rounds of impossible differentials for SPECK32 (7, 2) is higher thanSPECK32 (8, 3) , and the number of impossible differentials of SPECK32 (7, 2) is larger than SPECK32 (8, 3) for the same covered rounds. Therefore, the parameters (8, 3) have higher resistance than the original parameters (7, 2) against impossible differential attack.
B. COMPARISON RESULTS OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS FOR ZERO-CORRELATION LINEAR HULLS
In addition to searching for impossible differentials, we take advantage of the SAT-based model to automatically search zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK32 for arbitrary rotation parameters. We can obtain the number and the upper bound of rounds of zero-correlation linear hulls for SPECK32 (7, 2) and SPECK32 (8, 3) , and make a comparison of the strength. We traverse the sets with input and output masks of low Hamming weight. Table 8 gives the searching results of zero-correlation linear hulls, where the Hamming weight of input masks is one and the Hamming weight of output is two. Table 8 shows that the least upper bound of rounds of zero-correlation linear hulls for SPECK32 (7, 2) is the same as SPECK32 (8, 3) , both equal 6-round. But the number of zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK32 (7, 2) is larger than SPECK32 (8, 3) for the same covered rounds. Therefore, parameters (8, 3) have stronger resistance than the original parameters (7, 2) against zero-correlation linear attack.
C. COMPARISON RESULTS OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS FOR INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHERS
Regarding integral attack on SPECK32, we experimentally evaluate the number of rounds covered by integral distinguishers using the approach proposed by Wang et al. [16] . In order to maximize the number of rounds of integral distinguishers, we keep 31 bits of the input active and generate 2 31 plaintexts to search integral distinguisher of SPECK32 with different rotation parameters using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Search Integral Distinguisher for SPECK32
(1) Fix 1 bit of input to be constant, while the remaining 31 bits are active bits, then generate a set of 2 31 plaintexts P i .
(2) Randomly select key K and encrypt 2 31 plaintexts by rrounds to obtain ciphertexts C i . For each bit of ciphertexts C i [j] , calculate the XOR sum (3) Repeat (2) for 10 times to check whether the candidate is always valid. If it is not valid at least one time, discard it.
(4) If the candidate distinguisher is established for each guessed key, outputs the r-round integral distinguisher.
Here, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O 2 36 , the probability of the integral distinguisher is 1 − 2 1024 . In order to speed up the process, we construct a parallel solution architecture based on CUDA. The model uses the CPU and GPU computing resources collaboratively. GPU is more suitable for calculation with large data, high parallelism, low coupling and high computational density while CPU is more suitable for the processing of complex arithmetic instructions, multi-way branching and logic judgment programs. Considering the characteristics of CUDA, we generate 2 31 plaintexts-ciphertexts pairs using GPU for parallel computing, and estimate the XOR sum using CPU, which greatly reduces the time for searching integral distinguishers.
We search the number of rounds of integral distinguishers of SPECK32 with corresponding rotation parameters in our computer (GPU NVIDIA GTX 960). The sets of input of the first round is (CAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, A AAA, AAAA). We traverse 32 positions of constant bits C and search the output balanced bits. ForSPECK32 (7, 2) , we obtain six 6-round integral distinguishers while we obtain five 6-round integral distinguishers for SPECK32 (8, 3) . Besides, both SPECK32 (7, 2) and SPECK32 (8, 3) have no 7-round integral distinguishers, the least upper bound of rounds of integral distinguishers is 6. We list the searching results in Table 9 .
From the results presented in Table 9 , we observe that both the number of constant bits position and the number of integral distinguishers for SPECK32 (7, 2) are larger thanSPECK32 (8, 3) . Therefore, we show that although original rotation parameters (7, 2) in SPECK32 have reasonably good resistance against the integral attack, another rotation parameters (8, 3) have stronger resistance.
In conclusion, it turns out that original rotation parameters in SPECK32 are fairly well by taking account of impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral attacks, but may be not the best alternative, and we find that rotation parameters (8, 3) is better than original SPECK32.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates the security of lightweight block cipher SPECK proposed by NSA with respect to impossible differential, zero-correlation linear and integral attacks. We use SAT-based model to automatically search impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear hulls of SPECK, and then obtain some integral distinguishers based on the links between integral distinguisher and zero-correlation linear hull. Based on the new distinguishers, we give the first zero-correlation linear attack on 11-round SPECK64 and integral attacks on 11-round SPECK32, SPECK48 and SPECK64. Besides, we investigate the design principle of the rotation parameters selection of SPECK32. It turns out that the original rotation parameters in SPECK32 may not be the 
